the emptiness that is compassion an essay on buddhist ethics, essay …

One thing that many of these cases seem to have in common is that therule-violating action proceeds from a compassion that includes in itsscope not only the potential victims of the harms that are to beprevented, but also the perpetrator of those harms. When people hearof the Buddhist commitment to nonviolence, one question they often askis whether someone with foreknowledge of the events of the 1940s wouldbe permitted by Buddhist principles to assassinate Hitler in 1930. Ifwe follow Asaṅga, the answer would seem to be: yes, you may killHitler, if you have compassion for him and you do it partly for hissake. Thus, in extreme cases, violence may be permissible; but hatredis never justified.

The emptiness that is compassion an essay on buddhist ethics

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Wisdom of Emptiness - View on Buddhism: (Tibetan) …

The main goal of Buddhist practice is to reach freedom from sufferingby coming to see the world as it actually is and abandoning thedistorted projections that our thoughts and emotions create. A veryimportant means to reach this goal is to refrain from destructiveactions, since these actions cause harm to others and create mentaldisturbances in us that generate suffering and keep us from seeingthings as they are. Moreover, according to Buddhist teachings, thosewho reach the goal of freedom thenceforward act in a loving andcompassionate manner towards others, helping these others in turn tobe more happy and free. Ethical action is thus both an important partof the Buddhist path and an important aspect of the results said toflow from that path.

Eastern Buddhist Society - Index - New Series (2000 …

One way that Buddhist ethical theory might be used, in certain extremecases, to justify war relies on Asaṅga’s account ofjustifiable killing, discussed in section 4 above. For example, if theofficials of a militarily powerful state, monitoring the situation ina small developing country, see that a genocide has begun to takeplace there, they might reflect that those who are now committinggenocide are not only causing terrible harm to their victims, but alsoaccumulating severe negative karma for themselves. These officialsmight decide to intervene to stop the genocide, motivated bycompassion for everyone involved, including the killers. If they aresincerely motivated in this way, Mahāyāna Buddhists mightsee their actions as acceptable, even if they involved using militaryforce and killing many people, because less suffering would result andthe overall consequences would therefore be much better.

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Introduction to Buddhist understanding of wisdom; including the ultimate reality of emptiness.

Four of this, eight of that, seven of the other

Identifying the characteristics of Minjung Buddhism, Keel is less than positive about the interface between social engagement and Zen Buddhism as he asks “whether Zen enlightenment that aims to liberate us from the secular concerns in our lives is compatible with active practice of social ethics” (ibid.:28). Keel comes to the conclusion that Zen Buddhist identification of good and evil based on its doctrine of emptiness disables Zen Buddhism from offering social ethics; further, he claims that the identification of emptiness and forms deprives Zen of any room for ethics to be sustained within its system. Keel contends that the world confirmed with the enlightened mind, in which good is identified with evil, is not the same as that where the unenlightened individual suffers from various evils, the resolution of which is necessary for the members of a society to lead a happy life. Keel ends his essay with questions (ibid.:40): “Is emptiness compatible with compassion? Is it not that emptiness dissolves the real compassion that is needed to solve the real suffering of the sentient beings? . . . Where does compassion come from? . . . Is Buddhist compassion that is anchored on the wisdom of emptiness able to take the form of practical social ethics?”

Buddhist psychology: Selected insights, benefits, and research agenda for consumer psychology

Category: ethics - ethics – Otherwise

A question has been raised of whether Buddhist social engagement as offered by Minjung Buddhism can earn broader support from the Korean Buddhist community without first defining its relationship with Zen Buddhism, given that Zen Buddhism has been the dominant form of Buddhism in Korea. If we examine some details of the Minjung Buddhist understanding of Buddhist history and philosophy, the issue of defining the relationship between Zen and Minjung Buddhism appears to be critical. In an essay that considers the viability of Buddhist social engagement in the context of Korean Buddhism, the author Hee-Sung Keel summarizes Minjung Buddhism with the following six characteristics: (1) Minjung Buddhism considers the nature of the suffering of the people as socio-political, and refuses as idealism the idea of ascribing the cause of suffering to the individual’s mind; (2) it strongly criticizes traditional Korean Buddhism’s uncritical support for nationalism and its state-oriented nature; (3) it emphasizes the social and historical consciousness which Minjung Buddhism considers as lacking in traditional Korean Buddhism; (4) in this context, Minjung Buddhism is critical of Zen Buddhism for its individualistic and idealistic philosophy of the mind; (5) it highly values the Hīnayāna tradition and emphasizes the role of saṅgha as an ideal social community; (6) emphasizing the negative aspects of capitalism and nationalist Buddhism, it proposes the land of Maitreya as a Buddhist ideal society (Keel 1988:28).

Philosophy. Buddhist Ethics. Essay - 1031 Words

Not-self in Early Buddhism (Emptiness is Compassion Part …

I emphasize that in considering these terms together I am not suggesting that cetanā is synonymous with boulesis or indeed any other Aristotelian ethical term, and I am certainly not suggesting in this essay that Buddhist and Aristotelian ethics are structurally analogous. (See Garfield 2010/2011 and 2011 for more on this). I am only suggesting that there are good heuristic reasons for thinking about these terms at the same time because, despite the differences in their semantic range, and despite the structural differences between the theories in which they are at home, similar problems arise.