by Martin Bell (Penguin, 1990)Secondary sources:
by David Fate Norton (Cambridge, 1993)
Non-cognitivism first came on the scene as a rather starkly drawnalternative to prevailing cognitivist and realist construals of moraldiscourse. As it developed to enable it to explain features of moraldiscourse relied on by its critics, the view became more subtle andpresented a less stark contrast with realist positions. The mainnegative claims were often somewhat moderated. For example, the claimthat moral judgments had no descriptive meaning evolved into a claimthat any such meanings were secondary. The claim that moral judgmentscould not be true or false became the claim that they could be true orfalse only in a minimal or deflationary sense. Not all of the shiftshave been embraced by all non-cognitivists, but it is fair to say thatcurrent versions are more complex and subtle than the theories fromwhich they descend. As a result the arguments for and against the viewshave gotten rather intricate and even technical. That trend is likelyto continue for at least a while longer as ideas from other areas ofphilosophy are employed to further hone the objections and fill out theresponses to them.
by Rupert Read and Kenneth Richman (Routledge, 2000)
A short discussion of a still different collapse argument employedagainst noncognitivism by Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit, one whichhas generated quite a bit of literature, can be found in the followingsupplementary document.