by George Heffernan (Notre Dame, 1994)
by George Heffernan (Notre Dame, 1990)Secondary sources:
The basic intentional structure of consciousness, we find inreflection or analysis, involves further forms of experience. Thus,phenomenology develops a complex account of temporal awareness (withinthe stream of consciousness), spatial awareness (notably inperception), attention (distinguishing focal and marginal or“horizonal” awareness), awareness of one’s own experience(self-consciousness, in one sense), self-awareness(awareness-of-oneself), the self in different roles (as thinking,acting, etc.), embodied action (including kinesthetic awareness ofone’s movement), purpose or intention in action (more or lessexplicit), awareness of other persons (in empathy, intersubjectivity,collectivity), linguistic activity (involving meaning, communication,understanding others), social interaction (including collectiveaction), and everyday activity in our surrounding life-world (in aparticular culture).
by John Cottingham (Cambridge, 1992)
Furthermore, in a different dimension, we find various grounds orenabling conditions—conditions of the possibility—ofintentionality, including embodiment, bodily skills, cultural context,language and other social practices, social background, and contextualaspects of intentional activities. Thus, phenomenology leads fromconscious experience into conditions that help to give experience itsintentionality. Traditional phenomenology has focused on subjective,practical, and social conditions of experience. Recent philosophy ofmind, however, has focused especially on the neural substrate ofexperience, on how conscious experience and mental representation orintentionality are grounded in brain activity. It remains a difficultquestion how much of these grounds of experience fall within theprovince of phenomenology as a discipline. Cultural conditions thusseem closer to our experience and to our familiar self-understandingthan do the electrochemical workings of our brain, much less ourdependence on quantum-mechanical states of physical systems to which wemay belong. The cautious thing to say is that phenomenology leads insome ways into at least some background conditions of ourexperience.