by Stephen Gaukroger (Cambridge, 1998)

There is a clash of intuitions here between which it is difficult toarbitrate. There is an argument that is meant to favour the need for asubject, as claimed by Berkeley and Foster.

by George Heffernan (Notre Dame, 1994)

Descartes moved to Sweden in 1649, but did not survive his first winter there.

by George Heffernan (Notre Dame, 1990)Secondary sources:

The basic intentional structure of consciousness, we find inreflection or analysis, involves further forms of experience. Thus,phenomenology develops a complex account of temporal awareness (withinthe stream of consciousness), spatial awareness (notably inperception), attention (distinguishing focal and marginal or“horizonal” awareness), awareness of one’s own experience(self-consciousness, in one sense), self-awareness(awareness-of-oneself), the self in different roles (as thinking,acting, etc.), embodied action (including kinesthetic awareness ofone’s movement), purpose or intention in action (more or lessexplicit), awareness of other persons (in empathy, intersubjectivity,collectivity), linguistic activity (involving meaning, communication,understanding others), social interaction (including collectiveaction), and everyday activity in our surrounding life-world (in aparticular culture).

by John Cottingham (Cambridge, 1992)

Furthermore, in a different dimension, we find various grounds orenabling conditions—conditions of the possibility—ofintentionality, including embodiment, bodily skills, cultural context,language and other social practices, social background, and contextualaspects of intentional activities. Thus, phenomenology leads fromconscious experience into conditions that help to give experience itsintentionality. Traditional phenomenology has focused on subjective,practical, and social conditions of experience. Recent philosophy ofmind, however, has focused especially on the neural substrate ofexperience, on how conscious experience and mental representation orintentionality are grounded in brain activity. It remains a difficultquestion how much of these grounds of experience fall within theprovince of phenomenology as a discipline. Cultural conditions thusseem closer to our experience and to our familiar self-understandingthan do the electrochemical workings of our brain, much less ourdependence on quantum-mechanical states of physical systems to which wemay belong. The cautious thing to say is that phenomenology leads insome ways into at least some background conditions of ourexperience.

A few years later, Descartes offered (in Latin)  of his central tenets in (1641).
After an expanded statement of the, he argued that even is overcome by the certainty of as.

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The epiphenomenalist wishes to preserve the integrity of physicalscience and the physical world, and appends those mental features thathe cannot reduce. The parallelist preserves both realms intact, butdenies all causal interaction between them. They run in harmony witheach other, but not because their mutual influence keeps each other inline. That they should behave as if they were interactingwould seem to be a bizarre coincidence. This is why parallelism hastended to be adopted only by those—like Leibniz—whobelieve in a pre-established harmony, set in place by God. Theprogression of thought can be seen as follows. Descartes believes in amore or less natural form of interaction between immaterial mind andmaterial body. Malebranche thought that this was impossible naturally,and so required God to intervene specifically on each occasion on whichinteraction was required. Leibniz decided that God might as well setthings up so that they always behaved as if they wereinteracting, without particular intervention being required. Outsidesuch a theistic framework, the theory is incredible. Even within such aframework, one might well sympathise with Berkeley's instinct that oncegenuine interaction is ruled out one is best advised to allow that Godcreates the physical world directly, within the mental realm itself, asa construct out of experience.

Its general importance as an avenue to the contemplative life, however, is more general.

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For Husserl, then, phenomenology integrates a kind of psychologywith a kind of logic. It develops a descriptive or analytic psychologyin that it describes and analyzes types of subjective mental activityor experience, in short, acts of consciousness. Yet it develops a kindof logic—a theory of meaning (today we say logical semantics)—in that it describes and analyzes objective contents ofconsciousness: ideas, concepts, images, propositions, in short, idealmeanings of various types that serve as intentional contents, ornoematic meanings, of various types of experience. These contents areshareable by different acts of consciousness, and in that sense theyare objective, ideal meanings. Following Bolzano (and to some extentthe platonistic logician Hermann Lotze), Husserl opposed any reductionof logic or mathematics or science to mere psychology, to how peoplehappen to think, and in the same spirit he distinguished phenomenologyfrom mere psychology. For Husserl, phenomenology would studyconsciousness without reducing the objective and shareable meaningsthat inhabit experience to merely subjective happenstances. Idealmeaning would be the engine of intentionality in acts ofconsciousness.

by John Cottingham Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge, 1985)

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The second problem is that, if mental states do nothing, there is noreason why they should have evolved. This objection ties in with thefirst: the intuition there was that conscious states clearly modify ourbehaviour in certain ways, such as avoiding danger, and it is plainthat they are very useful from an evolutionary perspective.