Appearance And Reality By Bertrand Russell essay …
Bertrand russell appearance and reality essay - Unoiatech
Now this argument has an interesting corollary which Russell does notexplicitly draw. It may be that in Reality the pains I inflict on youaffect me—or at least a larger mind-like thing in which we bothparticipate—but if I never experience those effects,how can this give me a motive to do or forbear if my interestsconflict with yours? How can the fact that you and I are in Realityone (or at least part of one) give me a reason to look out for you, ifthis oneness is something I never experience? If Absolute Idealism canprovide no consolation for life's disasters—which is whatRussell is explicitly arguing—then it seems that it cannotsupply me with a reason not to visit those disasters on you, if doingso is likely to benefit me. It may be that I suffer in a metaphysicalsort of way when I profit at your expence, but if this suffering issomething I never feel (since I am effectively confined tothe world of Appearance) why should this bother me? Thus the Dualismof Practical Reason reasserts itself. Sometimes what is morally rightis at odds with what is prudentially right and when it is, there seemsno reason to prefer the one to the other.
Bertrand russell appearance and reality ..
Now Moore's twin assumptions have subsequently fallen upon hardtimes. The first leads straight to the Paradox of Analysis (seeLangford 1942), whilst the second would exclude synthetic identitiessuch as water is H2O. But if they werecorrect, the OQA would indeed dispose of the desire-to-desire theoryalong with kindred theories such as Hume's. It is notable that DavidLewis, who revived Russell's theory in 1989 (without realizing it wasRussell's), explicitly affirms what Moore implicitly denies—thatthere can be unobvious analytic truths; that is,truths not evident to every competent speaker (see Lewis 1989and Pigden 2007). But if Moore were correct and there were no suchthings, then naturalistic analyses of the moral concepts such asRussell's would be in big trouble. The BTA only worksagainst some naturalistic analyses of “good”,namely those that define “good” in terms of some propertythat the theorist wishes to promote. The OQA, if it works at all,works against them all. It seems very likely that what prompted Mooreto invent his philosophical weapon of mass destruction was thedesire-to-desire theory of Bertrand Russell.